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Abstract:  
 
After more than 60 years of successful integration the EU entered the deepest crisis since its 
establishment. In this long perspective the benefits of integration were undisputed, which 
justify its increasing extention to the new members and new field of activities.  
 
Meanwhile, the EU passes lately through several problems related to economic downturn in 
the euro area, Brexit and the crisis of refugees. These crises have given rise to discussions 
about the best methods of overcoming them. One of the possible solutions leading to rescue 
an idea of European integration is to escape forward through the implementation of “Europe 
two speed”.  
 
The purpose of this article is to analyze the concept of “Europe of two speed”, its rationale 
and the advantages and the possibility of its implementation in the context of the further 
evolution of the EU. The point is that some European countries see the need for deeper 
integration as panacea for crisis, but others do not see sense in improving the mechanism for 
political integration and rather opting out for economic cooperation limited to the single 
market or even free trade. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The European integration is continuously evolving, and its driving rationale has 
always been the need for an economic benefit as well as political cooperation. The 
number of the Member States of the EU has grown from 6 to 28, which increases its 
differentiation as in terms of economic, political and social sphere. At first, 
European integration was established on the principles of liberalization within 
customs union or free trade areas. The introduction of free trade had brought a huge 
increase in trade flows in Europe, as it is calculated that positive effect of the 
creation surpassed several times negative consequences of the trade diversion 
(Balassa, 1974, p. 27, Prewo, 1974, p. 379-405). The liberalization of trade has 
increased intra-regional weight, so that the countries of our continent have become 
the most important trade partners for each other. Positive results brought also the 
liberalization of the movement of factors of production (capital, services and 
people); the implementation only the single market program could bring Member 
States an increase in the GDP from 4.3% to 6.4.% (Cechini, 1988, p. 84). 
 
After establishing the European single market, the next logical steps were to 
establish an economic and monetary union. It said that in Europe, like in the US one 
market would be better served by one money, so against a free float, the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) was expected to yield more opportunities to develop 
international transactions. Overall it was thought that monetary integration would be 
conducive to improve the efficiency and better allocation of resources due to 
elimination of risk associated with changing rate of exchange, reduction of 
transaction costs, transparency of prices, better integration of financial market. 
Before crisis intra-area trade flows in the euro area accounted for 1/3 of the area's 
GDP up from ¼ in 1998 and FDI stood at one third of GDP member countries as 
compared to one fifth. According to the European Commission the elimination of 
exchange rate volatility could explain up to half of trade development and up to two 
thirds of increase of foreign direct investments (European Economy 2008, p. 474).  
 
Despite economic success the EU has passed lately by the deepest crisis since its 
inception; the global downturn in 2008 has showed some weakness in principles and 
organizational structures of euro arrangement. Moreover, on the crisis in the euro 
area has also imposed refugee crisis and the political deadlock with an instance of 
the UK from the EU.  The conclusions coming from the crisis are that the cost and 
benefits of the EU were not fully assessed, and the European integration should be 
evaluated again from the perspective of interest of different countries. One of the 
proposed solutions to the EU crisis should be restructured  organization and  
realization of the concept of so called “two speed Europe”, hence the purpose of this 
article is to analyze the concept of “two speeds Europe”, its rationale, costs and 
benefits and the possibility of its implementation in the context of the further 
evolution of the EU. 
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The EU should provide a clear vision of the evolution of future development and 
mutual alignment of the relations between the Member States. On the one hand the 
crisis in the euro area clearly shows that the EMU is still an unfinished house, on the 
other hand the EU must take into consideration the consequences of Brexit, flows of 
refuges, growing protectionist tendencies in the world. Solution to today problems 
it's not just about freezing the level of integration and the existing institutional 
structures, but above all dish countries of choice, feel they need to close integration, 
or name your own business they want to reduce the level of cooperation. It is 
considered that the EU need a deep institutional reform now, these reforms if they 
are to be effective can only be carried out in a limited circle of member countries.  
 
Sources the concept of integration of two speed Europe should be sought primarily 
in last decade of XX century, when there was a period of deep transformations in 
Europe, both political and economic. During this period there was also a breakdown 
of the existing European Monetary System, which had stabilized for years the 
currencies exchange rate. Facing the process of Eastern enlargement, the EU 
countries have been taken the initiative of closer integration of existing members 
countries. In a new strategy of European integration would establish two concepts of 
integration: deepening of the EU or  widening  towards new member countries. In 
the discussions often deepening opposed widening, they had prevailed opinion that 
the EU had to progress its deepening before accepting the new partners.  
 
The price for the unification of Germany was the consent of West Germany on the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty, leading to the introduction of euro. The report 
titled: “One Market, One Money” asserted that the European single market needed 
one currency, but condition of euro introduction was the fulfillment of so-called 
criteria of convergence (Delors, 1990, p. 1-4 and 74-100). Therefore, the 
introduction of euro has first led to the division of the EU members to those 
countries, which have reached convergence indicators and those countries outside 
the euro area. Before enlargement of the EU to ten new members there were also 
discussion on conditions of mutual integration, if newcomers may assume all 
common standards, considering their  heterogeneity in terms of economic, social and 
cultural affairs. Moreover Brexit, crisis in euro area and refugee problems give 
additional inspiration for new proposals, new concepts of integration to find an 
answer to the question how Europe should be restructured in the 21st century. 
 
2. The Political Conception of “two speed Europe” 
 
Rapidly changing environment inside and outside the EU witnessed of the 
permanent lack of adequate the existing model of integration to the new situations 
(Konopacki, 1998, p. 116). The basis of the European integration were free trade, 
customs union and common market providing freedom of exchange goods, services, 
capital and workers. In the years 80-the EU took up the reform of the common 
market to complete it into the single market, where not only direct barriers to trade 
and factors production flows, but also all indirect barriers have been abolished 
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(Kundera, 2003, p. 93-143). The single market was formally introduced in 1992; 
complement to the single market was to show off the Schengen Convention on the 
free movement of the crossing of internal frontiers. Several new members states 
(Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania Slovakia, Poland, Slovenia) 
have been covered by the free movement of people, to the Schengen area belongs 
also to some European countries that are not members of the EU like Norway, 
Iceland or Switzerland, but some like Romania, Bulgaria, Ireland Croatia are not 
today members of Schengen. Thus far no one disputes out of the need to keep free 
trade and free flow of capital in Europe, but what is challenged is the free movement 
people, which is abused especially in connection with the influx of refugees to 
Europe.  
 
The concept of Europe of two speeds is the answer to making changes in the 
integration rules in reference with increasing diversity of the EU partners. Initially 
integration was limited to economic objectives, but the current economic objectives 
are interwoven with political objectives. The EU has common policies in several 
spheres like trade, competition, transport, agriculture, regional policy, common 
monetary policy. The introduction of the euro divided de facto EU countries into 
two groups, those countries that have provided their sovereignty about the monetary 
policy to the ECB (19 countries) and which have retained autonomy in the field of 
emission of national currency (Denmark, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Sweden, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia).  
 
Therefore, in the Europe of two speeds a distinction shall be made between the core 
group of member states the most advanced in economic development, implementing 
all the provisions of the Treaties and a group of peripheries. Some authors consider 
the   core countries as of all member of the euro-area (19 countries), the others 
include to this group the 15-member states of old EEC, while peripheral countries 
are generally the countries that joined the EU after 2004. After the crisis in 2008 
some authors include also into this group of countries that have been most affected 
by the economic crisis like Greece or Portugal, which are characterized by 
continuing trouble in accomplishing the convergence criterion, lower level of 
development and lower competitiveness.   
 
Although the concept of “two speed Europe” can become a tool for the management 
of diversity of societies, it's hard to resist the impression that it creates a first-class 
Europe and its second category. Model of integration which questioning the 
principle of equal rights and obligations of the members is the concept “Europe a la 
carte”. This concept is based on choice participation in the integration processes or 
the scope of participation that it allows states to choose certain programs or policies 
from the Community menu, and the resignation of the other belonging to the acquis 
communautarie. This model could only designate a minimum area of integration like 
free trade or single market, that Member States would have to accept, but on the 
other occasions they should be offered complete freedom in deciding whether to 
further participation in the integration process. The “Europe a la carte” reflects the 
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approach to Europe as a group of countries associated with its different levels of 
cooperation. On the one hand this looking as somewhat realistic approach, on the 
other hand it gives the choice to individual countries to participate in only the most 
favorable for them joint ventures.  
 
The implementation of the concept of Europe a la carte can lead of course to 
conflicts within the EU rather than counteract them. It would be in the first place 
here to extract the set of basic obligations of the Member States to the EU, but the 
lack of effective control over their policies could lead to drifts in the process of 
European integration. Therefore, a lighter form of the concept of “two speed 
Europe” seems to be the idea of “varied cooperation” or “multi speed Europe”. 
"Varied cooperation "is quite an elegant euphemism for a Europe of multi speed.  
The concept of “multi speed Europe” can be described as the pursuit of common 
objectives of integration, but according to the varied schedule. This means that all 
member countries accept the common objectives of European unity and adopt the 
acquis the objectives, but don’t carry out it with the same speed. This model leads to 
crystallize leaders’ group, which follow other countries. For some purpose’s weaker 
member countries, it will  possibly come to common objective later. This delay may 
depend on their own preferences or from the internal conditions of the state. 
Simultaneously stronger members are obliged to assist the weaker in this venture, 
but the actual degree of achievement of solidarity in this area may be symbolic.  
 
The concept of varied cooperation should be assessed and associate not only 
negatively, but also positively; although controversial the conception now has many 
supporters. The division of European countries according to the different speeds of 
integration may affect both the extent of their participation in the freedoms flows, as 
well as in the various common policies. Not every EU action is good for all member 
countries at any time. Some countries retain the right not to join the euro until their 
economic level will rise enough to not have been exposed to external shocks. Not all 
countries are interested in developing a common energy policy or European defense 
policy. Other countries may keep at least temporarily border controls, if they argue 
in favor of including security considerations, or they want to keep their own 
tradition of law, administration or education systems.   
 
Currently drawing much attention the ability to the ability to divide EU members 
with reference with compliance with the code of conduct of the EU fundamental 
values. Multi-speed Europe" should not also mean sustainable, the official 
separation between these countries, which always strive for strong integration and 
those that are integrated into it looser. Each country evaluates without coercion his 
benefits and costs of participation in the various programs of integration, when he 
chooses not to participate in each moment in the closer integration, they don’t not 
have a closed door and could to join such initiatives later. 
 
The current shape of the EU seems less and less attractive for Member States, so 
there is a need to reform the European institutions. If reform there will not be 
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possible across the EU, it may be limited to certain Member States. Frist of all we 
need to deepen and enhance the Economic and Monetary Union with common 
budget. No doubts that " first speed Europe" rise around the euro area and stronger 
cooperation and financial stability there. Secondly, a major concern for EU 
integration will be the arrangement of future relations with the United Kingdom 
after Brexit. The point is that the UK has not remained on the sidelines of European 
integration, and it was turned on in this process is convenient for both sides of the 
formula. Thirdly, the reform of the EU should allow slow down the processes of 
integration of some Central European countries, which are not yet sufficiently 
prepared for the acceptance of all policies and obligations arising from participation 
in the EU. 
 
3. The Legal Basis of “two speed Europe” 
 
The legal basis of the concept of “two speeds Europe” can be seen in two pieces of 
legislation contained in Europe at the end of the fifties, namely: The Treaties of 
Rome and Stockholm Convention (Konwencja and Sztokholm, 1960; Rzym, 1957). 
The Treaty of Rome as well as the Stockholm Convention obliged European 
countries to open their markets and mutual trade liberalization. The common 
element in making the free exchange was also a concern for the protection of free 
competition: both Treaties have banned monopolistic agreements among enterprises 
and abuse of their dominant position (Art.15 Konwencja Sztokholm, 4.01. 1960, art. 
85 Traktat 1957).  
 
However, the scope of the liberalization of economic exchange within the European 
Economic Community - EEC was wider than under European Free Trade 
Association - EFTA. In EFTA free trade didn’t include the exchange of agricultural 
goods and full freedom of migration of workers as within the EEC; fitted in EFTA 
only freedom to establish firms in the partner countries and in connection with this 
the right their entrepreneurs to settle down to run a business. 
 
Among the EFTA countries lacked also obligation concerning political coordination, 
to which require the member countries of the Treaty of Rome. These differences 
were based on two different concepts of the European cooperation:  the functional 
and institutional integration. It is known that proponents of functional integration 
treat it as a method to return to the conditions of a free market. Because the regional 
grouping should be in their opinion wide open on the outside, so they prefer to base 
integration on the principles of a free-trade area. In turn, supporters of institutional 
integration are in favor of the customs union as the basis of integration, which 
restricts the sovereignty of member states in the field of commercial policy. If 
functional integration is in favor of reduction in the intervention policy in economies 
of the member states, the advocates of the institutional integration   are opting for a 
wide coordination of economic policies among the partners. The latter agree to the 
transfer of competence of the national states to transnational bodies in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity. 
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As far as the above concepts laid at the basis of the appointment of two competing 
trade blocks in Europe with varying degrees of integration. The EEC was set up 
originally by six countries: Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland and 
Luxembourg and the EFTA were founded on the initiative of the United Kingdom 
and included Austria, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. Because 
of leaving the EFTA by UK, Sweden, Finland, Austria; subsequent the EEC’ 
extensions discussion on Europe of two speeds moved from “outside” into ‘inside’ 
of the EU. For example, the Maastricht Treaty has introduced for the first time that 
integration process would leave some members out of the monetary union.  
 
According to this Treaty the countries that fulfil the so-called the convergence 
criteria were able to adopt the euro, but those countries which do not fulfil had to 
wait for joining the monetary union later. Besides because of opposition to the idea 
of euro, together with UK a similar op-out clause was given to Denmark. Sweden 
also asked for an opt- out clause, which was denied, but diplomatic solution was 
found whereby she did not enter the ERM (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2004, p. 383-
384).  
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force on 1 May 1999 made it possible 
for Member States to use in certain conditions with the idea of enhanced 
cooperation.  Areas in which enhanced cooperation became possible between a 
limited number of states was the so called first and third pillar. While the 
Amsterdam Treaty provided for enhanced cooperation only in respect of the 
European Community and cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, the 
Treaty of Nice provides for its application in relation to all pillars. According to 
Article 43 Treaty of Nice Member States, which intend to establish enhanced 
cooperation between themselves may make use of the institutions, procedures and 
mechanisms laid down by the Treaty provided that the proposed cooperation: 
 
(a) is aimed at furthering the objectives of the Union and of the Community, at  
      protecting and serving their interests and at reinforcing their process of    
      integration; 
(b) respects the said Treaties and the single institutional framework of the Union; 
(c) respects the acquis communautaire and the measures adopted under the other  
      provisions of the said Treaties; 
(d) remains within the limits of the powers of the Union or of the Community and  
     does not concern the areas which fall within the exclusive competence of the  
     Community; 
(e) does not undermine the internal market; 
(f) does not constitute a barrier to or discrimination in trade between the Member  
     States and does not distort competition between them; 
(g) involves a minimum of eight Member States; 
(h) respects the competences, rights and obligations of those Member States which  
     do not participate therein;  
(i) does not affect the provisions of the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into     
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     the framework of the European Union; 
(j) is open to all the Member States. Moreover, enhanced cooperation may be   
    undertaken only as a last resort, when such cooperation cannot be attained within     
    a reasonable period by applying the relevant provisions of the Treaties. When  
    enhanced cooperation is being established between limited number of countries, it  
    shall be open to all Member States at any time (EN Official Journal 2001, Article  
    43). 
 
4. Economic Conceptions of “two speed Europe”   
 
In connection with the concept of the multi speed Europe always the question arises 
as to which countries are fit for the first speed of integration, and which countries 
remain outside this group. It can of course be assumed that the “first speed Europe” 
creates the euro area and the countries which have not adopted the euro are in 
“Europe of second speed”. However, the crisis year 2008 shows that some euro area 
countries found it difficult to become the member of EMU, hence the case split the 
EU on various speed seems to be more complicated than just a formal break between 
euro and non -euro area. In order to determine the criteria for the first and second 
speed of Europe one can refer to the theory of optimum currency area that defines 
the conditions of the appointment by the partners to the joint monetary integration. 
 
The conception of optimum currency area was elaborated by R. Mundell who 
analyses the conditions that are necessary to introduce a common currency between 
different regions or partner countries and benefits and costs of flexible or fixed 
exchange rates (Mundell, 1961). He described different complex situation of factors 
mobility or immobility between regions and countries, where flexible exchange rate 
policy is used mainly to overcome a lack of factor mobility. If there is high 
geographic factor mobility across all regions, then in his view the country’s regions 
compose an optimum currency area.  
 
Nevertheless, regions with high mobility of factors of production are not necessarily 
defined by national boundaries and optimum currency areas may be composed of the 
several states and there may be optimum currency areas within the states. In today’s 
global economy capital is highly mobile as internally as well internationally, so the 
real problems in the Mundell’s theory concern the mobility of labor. If labor is not 
mobile internationally, then the best policy for a country open to international trade 
is to keep a flexible exchange rate for its currency. R. Mundell argues that the world 
can be divided into regions, that constitute separate currencies within each there is 
labor mobility.   
 
Based on Mundell’s theory one of the leading theorists of international integration 
J.E. Meade contended that conditions for the introduction of a common currency did 
not exist in Europe at time of setting up EEC, because of the low mobility of the 
labor force. He shared the opinion that under conditions of low mobility of factors of 
production in the common market a system of flexible exchange rates would be 
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more effective in promoting balance of payments equilibrium among partners and 
consequently their internal stabilities (Meade, 1957). 
 
From the point of view of the euro member countries it is interesting to analyze how 
above-mentioned theory applies now to the conditions of the European single 
market. According to Eurostat Statistics in 2017 in sum there were 36.9 million 
people born outside of the EU-28 living in a single market (about 7.5%), while there 
were 20.4 million persons who had been born in a different EU Member State from 
the one where they were resident. In 2017, the largest numbers of non-nationals 
living in the EU Member States were found in Germany (9.2 million persons), the 
United Kingdom (6.1 million), Italy (5.0 million), France (4.6 million) and Spain 
(4.4 million). Non-nationals in the five countries with biggest immigration 
collectively represented 76% of the total number of non-nationals living in all the 
EU Member States. In Germany part of immigration from the EU accounted for only 
39.2% of total migration, in France-21.2%, in Italy-20.8%, Spain-28%.  
 
In one-year 2016 a total of 4.3 million people immigrated to one of the EU-28 
Member States, but among these there were an estimated 2.0 million citizens of non-
member countries, 1.3 million people with citizenship of a different EU Member 
State, around 929 thousand people who migrated to a mother country (returning 
nationals or nationals born abroad). One year earlier to the EU came mainly refugees 
and immigrants from third countries -2.4 million. From these numbers one can see 
that the influx of immigrants from third countries to the EU is 1.8 times more 
intense than the citizens migration between partner countries. Taking into 
consideration that on average about 3.9% of emigration flows is comprised of the 
citizens from member countries in the EU population, Baldwin and Wyplosz 
conclude that labor Europeans move not intensively between member countries only 
half as often as US citizens (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2006, p. 364-365).  
 
Table 1. Immigration in Europe by citizenship in thousands and % in 2016 
Country Total National   Citizens of the 
EU partners                                      
 Citizens                                                                           
of non- member
countries 
Austria   129.5               9.8  (7.5%)            64.7  (50%)                   54.5 (42.1%) 
Belgium 123.7     17.6 (14.2%) 58.9 ( 47.6%)                       46.5 (37.6%) 
Bulgaria                             21.2 9.3 (43.6%)        1.3 (6,2%)                           10.6 (50%) 
CzechRepublic                  64.1                                4.5  (7.1%) 29.0 (6.3%) 29.9 (46.7%) 
Croatia 14.0 7.7 (55.3%) 2.2  (15.8%) 4.0  (28.9%) 
Cyprus                                       17.4 3.6 (20.5%)             7.4  (42.3%)                      6.5  (7.3%) 
Denmark                             74.4 19.7 (26.5%)      25.0 (33.6%)                           28.6 (38.4%) 
Estonia 14.8 7.1  (48.1%) 3.5 (23.7%) 4.2 (49.2%) 
Finland 34.9               7.6  (21.9%)  7.1  (20.3%)                  19.6  (56.3%) 
France 378.1         137.2 (36.3%)  82.7 (21.9%) 158.2 ( 41.8%) 
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Italy 300.8           37.9 (12.8%)            62.7  (20.8%) 200.2 (66.6%) 
Ireland 85.2           28.0 (32.9%) 28.9 (33.9%) 27.2 (31.9%) 
Germany                         1029.9    110.5 (10.7%)        403.6 (39.2%)                    507.0 (49.2%)   
Greece 116.9          30.7 (26.3%)      16.6 (14.2%)                   69.5 (59.5%) 
Hungary 53.6              29.8 (55.6%) 10.5 (19.8%) 13.3  (24.7%) 
Latvia 8.3             4.9  (58.7%)              0.5  (6.0%)                       2.9  (34.9%) 
Lithuania 20.2            14.2  (70.5%)            0.8  (3.7%)                     5.2  (25.7%) 
Luxembourg 22.9              1.3  (5.8%)             16.0 (69.7%)                   5.6    (24.3%) 
Malta 17.1               1.4  (8.1%)            9.0 (52.8%)                     6.7  (39.3%) 
Netherlands 189.2              42.5 (22.5%)         63.9  (33.8%)                 76.7 (40.5%) 
Poland     208.3             105.4 (50.6%)          22.8 (10.9%)                  80.1 (38.4%) 
Portugal 29.9               4.9  (49.7%)            7.2 (24.1%)                7.8 (26.2%) 
Romania 137.5            119.6 (87.0%)                5.6  (4.1%)                12.3 (8.9%) 
Slovakia 7.7                4.1  (53.0%)            3.0  (38.9%) 0.6    (8.1%) 
Slovenia 16.6                2.9  (17.2%)            3.4  (20.4%)                  10.4  (62.4%) 
Spain 414.7           62.6 (15.1%)        116.3  (28.0%)               235.6 (56.8%) 
Sweden 163 20.0 (12.3%)            30.5 (18.7%)                104.4 (64.0%) 
United 
Kingdom                
589 74.2 (12.6%)           249.4 (42.3%)              265.4  (45.1%) 
Source: Eurostat ( online data code:migr_imm1ctz ).                   
 
In 2016 Germany reported the largest total number of immigrants (1,029 million), 
followed by the United Kingdom (589 thousand), Spain (414 thousand), France (378 
thousand), Italy (300 thousand), Poland (236 thousand) (see table no 1). Among the 
states of the EU: 21 reported more immigration than emigration, but in Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Romania the number of emigrants 
outnumbered the number of immigrants. In relative term Luxembourg reported the 
largest share of immigrants coming from another EU Member State (93% of its total 
number of immigrants), followed by Slovakia (80%) and Romania (74%); relatively 
low shares were reported by Sweden (24% of all immigrants), as well as Italy 
(25%). In 19 of the EU’ states, most non-nationals were citizens of non-member 
countries; the opposite was true only for Belgium, Ireland, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovakia and the United Kingdom 
(http://ec.europa). 
 
In the view of neoclassical economics mobility of labor may be substituted by 
flexibility of the labor market in its function to recover the equilibrium. Flexibility 
of the labor market means mainly the wage elasticity and interregional or inter-
sectoral mobility of labor. The economic shocks may have different effects on 
workers mobility depending on the character of labor institutions. Among 
economists there is prevailing opinion that both systems of trade unions: strong 
centralization or strong decentralization, are equally well equipped to face economic 
shocks in monetary union. The countries can use the advantages of one system far 
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more effectively than countries with an intermediate degree of centralization of trade 
unions.  
 
In Europe it is generally accepted that there are four main models of industrial 
relations systems: 1) Nordic corporatism; 2) social partnership; 3) liberal pluralism; 
4) state centered. Simultaneously the EU members are often divided into: 
Scandinavian, Continental, Anglo-Saxon, Southern, Eastern and Mediterranean 
group. The  Scandinavian countries follow the Nordic corporatism model (Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden), most of the Continental group have some form of social 
partnership (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands plus Slovenia); 
the Anglo-Saxon states and some Mediterranean follow the liberal pluralism model 
(Ireland, Cyprus, Malta); the Southern group, together with France, has state-
centered systems (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain); Eastern  states often 
showing characteristics of both liberal pluralism and state-centered systems (Trade 
Unions Brussels, 2010).  
 
Given such a large diversity of the functioning of trade unions in Europe it is 
difficult to conclude that labor markets work flexibly in euro area; rather divergent 
unions interest sometimes make international dialogue impossible. The trade unions 
in euro area countries often find it difficult to speak a common language as far as 
wage and employment policy is concerned. When we look at the roots of the crisis 
in euro after 2008, we see  that financial disturbances was partly consequences of 
trade and wage imbalances among partner countries, when the two group of 
countries had developed with a surplus in foreign trade (Germany, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Belgium) and the countries recording a deficit in current account (Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy).  
 
The basis of trade imbalances were the structural factors: productivity growth and 
wages trend diverge caused the lowering competitiveness of some economies about 
others. If for example within a period of eight years before the crisis wages in the 
euro area increased by an average of 14%, in Germany only by 2%, but by 17% in 
France, Italy by 23% and Spain as much as 26% (Saint- Etienne, Paris 2011, p. 34, 
59). 
 
By another shot the countries that are the most open are the most fit to create a 
common currency. The openness of an economy can be judged on the concept of 
ratio of tradable to non-tradable goods, that classifies tradable goods as those that 
can enter foreign trade and no tradable goods cannot enter foreign trade due to some 
reasons, for example of high transportation costs. According to McKinnon in an 
economy, that is open to international trade flexible exchange rates lose their 
effectiveness as a control device for external balance (McKinnon, 1963, p. 717–
725).  
 
In a highly open economy improvement in trade balance can be better accomplished 
by domestic absorption, reduction of public spending would occur mainly by 
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tradable goods and decrease of import at the costs of small reduction of employment 
in the no tradable sector. Therefore, the fixed rate of exchange or a common 
currency would be better adapted for controlling external balance equilibrium and 
price stability in open economies, at the same time creating a lower adjustment costs 
for resource allocation.  
 
Table 2. Participation of trade in goods and services in GDP of EU countries in 
2016 
Countries trade in goods  as % of GDP               trade in services as % of 
GDP 
Austria 100 28.2 
Belgium 164 47.3 
Bulgaria 124 25.2 
Czech Republic                      152 22.4 
Denmark 101 33.8 
Estonia 154 44.5 
Finland 72 22.5 
France 60 19.1 
Germany 84 16.9 
Greece 62 20.0 
Hungary 169 32.2 
Ireland 221 111 
Italy 56 11 
Latvia 119 28.1 
Lithuania   148 29.6 
Luxembourg 407 286.8 
Netherlands 154 38.3 
Poland 100 17.8 
Portugal 79 21.4 
Romania 84 16.7 
Slovak 186 18.4 
Slovenia 146 26.3 
Spain 63 15.9 
Sweden 84 25.9 
United Kingdom                         58 20.3 
Euro area                                     84 23.7 
European Union                          83 23.3 
China 37 5.9 
USA   27 6.7 
Source: Trade (% of GDP) World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National 
Accounts data files. License: Open. Line Bar Map. Share Details. Label. 1960 – 2016, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS, Trade in services (% of GDP) 
International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files, ... 
Share Details. Label 1960 – 2016, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BG.GSR.NFSV.GD.ZS 
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As seen in Table 2 the euro area countries are more open economies (84% -share of 
merchandise trade in GDP and 23.7% -share of exchange of services in GDP) than 
the US (27% - merchandise trade and 6.7% - services) or China (37% - merchandise 
trade and 5.9% services). In 2016 the average share of international turnover of 
goods in GDP was in euro area more than twice the size of the economy of China 
and of the United States, and the share of turnover in services in the GDP was 
almost four times larger. Among the EU countries the most open to trade in goods 
and services in relation with GDP were the smallest countries: Luxembourg (407% 
and 286.8%), Slovenia (146 % and 26.3%), Estonia (154% and 44.5%), Belgium 
(164% and 47.3%), Netherlands (154% and 38.3%), Ireland (221% and 111%), 
Latvia (119% and 28.1%) and Slovak (186 % trade).  
 
Because the transaction costs would weight more heavily in the small open 
economies, from the point of view of trade openness these countries qualify the most 
to become the member of monetary union. Below the EU average the share of 
international trade in goods and services in GDP were in such countries as Greece 
(62 % and 20.0%), Spain (63 % and 15.9%), Portugal (79% and 21.4%), Finland 
(72% and 22.5%) and Italy (56% and 11%). These countries being less open to 
international trade might experience less  benefits of monetary union then more open 
economies.  
 
Additionally, the essential element of an optimum currency area is also the diversity 
in a nation’s products mix, because well diversified national economies are more 
able to withstand abrupt changes in international transactions and serve to average 
out external shocks. While diversification reflected in export diversification then it 
may bring less frequent changes in the country’ terms of trade and rate of exchange 
(Kenen 2007, p. 41–60). So, if we divide Europe according to different speed, we 
should consider above all the economic structure of these countries and their level of 
productivity. When the partners of integration processes have the similar economic 
structure, productivity and economic policies, the business cycles between their 
economies may be broadly synchronized and the costs of establishing monetary 
union between them would be lower.  
 
Statistical data shows that the EU countries have similar structure of production and 
consumption like the USA. The share of agriculture in the creation of GDP is much 
higher in the economy of China, India, or Russia than on average in the EU, 
industry's share of GDP is higher in China and Russia, the share of services is much 
lower in the economy of China, India, or Russia than on average in the EU. The EU 
countries specialize mainly in the medium advanced technological production and 
traditionally they are competitive when it comes to such industries as machine 
industry, automotive, telecommunications, chemicals, financial services, in 
biotechnology, but in international markets competing poorly in computers and 
informatics. The main export items in the euro area were machinery and transport 
equipment (36.29%) and chemicals and related products (17.45%). 
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Table 3. List of EU countries by GDP sector composition in 2017 
Countries Agriculture Industry   Services 
Austria 1.5                     29.4                   69.1 
Belgium 0.7                   21.7                   77.6 
Bulgaria 5.2                   30.6                    64.2 
Dania 4.5                    19.1                   76.4 
Estonia 3.5                     28.5                   61 
Finland 3.0                     29.2                   67.8 
France 1.8                    18.8                    79.4 
Germany 0.8                    28.6                    70.6 
Greece 3.3                     17.9                    78.9 
Hungary 3.7                     31.3                    65.0 
Italy 2.0                     24.7                    73.4 
Lithuania 3.3                     28.2                    68.6 
Netherlands 2.7                                                                  24.2           73.1 
Poland 3.4                      33.6                    63.0 
Portugal 2.5                      22.8                   74.7 
Romania 7.9                      32.9                    59.2 
Slovakia 3.8                     35.5                    60.7    
Spain 3.2                     25.8                    71.0 
Sweden 1.8                     27.3                    70.9 
United Kingdom                                           0.7                     21.0                    78.3 
European Union                                           1.8 24.9                     73.2 
USA                                                              1.12     19.1                     79.7 
China                                                            10.1 46.8                    43.1   
India                                                                                                                   17.4 25.8                    56.9 
Russia 4.5                       36.9                    58.6                                                         
Source: https:// en. wiki/list_ of _ countries _ by _GDP_sector_composition. 
 
Taking into considerations sectors statistics it is hardly to say that euro area 
members have the same production structure that the most developed partners. The 
participation of agriculture in GDP is much higher in Greece, than in Germany 
France, Belgium or Holland, industry in France and Italy employs less than in 
Germany, services in the southern countries like Greece, Spain and Portugal are 
based mainly on the development of tourism. As seen in table 3, the importance of 
agriculture in the economy is much larger than the EU average (1.8%) in such 
countries as Romania (7.9%), Poland (3.4%), Slovakia (3.8%), Spain (3.2%), 
Bulgaria (5.2%), Denmark (4.5%), Finland (3%), Greece (3.3%) and Hungary 
(3.7%). In turn, the industry's share in the creation of GDP is higher than the EU 
average (24.9%) in such countries as: Austria (29.4%), Bulgaria (30.6%), Estonia 
(28.5%), Finland (29.2%), Hungary (31.3%), Lithuania (28.2%), Poland (33.6%), 
Romania (32.9%), Slovakia (35.5%), Sweden (27.3%) and Germany (28.6%).  In 
countries where there is a large share of agriculture and industry in the GDP there is 
of course the smallest share of services. Higher than the EU average share of 
services in GDP (73.2%) have only Belgium (77.6%), Denmark (76.4%), France 
(79.4%), Greece (78.9%), Italy (73.4%) and Portugal (74.7%)  
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Furthermore, in the euro area there are also differences when it comes to the labor 
productivity and the location of production with high added value. If we assume that 
labor productivity in the EU- 15 was at 109.2% of all EU members in 2010, labor 
productivity in  Germany was at 105.9%, in Belgium at 127.5%, in France at 
119.9%,  in the Netherlands at 114.9%, in Austria at 113.2%, in Spain 110.3%, but 
in Estonia at 70.1%,  in Portugal 77.2%, in Slovenia at 81.9%, in Slovakia at 82.6%, 
in Lithuania at 62.9%, in Latvia at 54.9%. For the other countries outside the euro 
area labor productivity was in Czech Republic at 71.8% of the EU average, in 
Hungary at 70.9%, in Poland at 66.6% in Romania at 47.4%, in Bulgaria at 41.5%, 
but at 113.3% in Sweden (Eurostat, 2012). The euro area competitive position in 
terms of the intensity of use of the factors of production is 1.1 when it comes to 
labor, 1.2 when it comes to capital and 1.1 when it comes to research, in the United 
States in turn, 0.9 is for labor, 0.8 for capital and research significantly add 1.4. This 
means that the U.S. produce and export much more high-tech goods than on average 
the countries of the euro area  
 
While there has been real convergence in the EU owing to the catching up of central 
and eastern European economies, there has been no process of real convergence 
among the euro countries, especially after 2008. The relatively low-income countries 
have maintained (Spain and Portugal) or even increased (Greece) their income gaps 
with respect to the average; moreover, Italy, initially a higher-income country, 
recorded the worst performance, suggesting substantial divergence from the high-
income group. This lack of convergence was related to several factors, notably weak 
institutions, structural rigidities, weak productivity growth, lack of macroeconomic 
stability and sound fiscal policy; favorable conditions for an efficient use of capital 
and labor in the economy supporting total factor productivity growth (Bancherul, 
ECB 2015, p. 1-35).  
 
Less developed European countries, being less well equipped in capital and having a 
lesser qualified labor force export less technologically intensive goods and have less 
opportunities to develop intra-industry specialization with better developed partners. 
The calculation of intra-industry share in trade between the EU partners shows that 
before euro crisis the intra-industry trade ( ITT ) coefficient was advanced in the 
most developed countries of the euro area: in France- 83%, Belgium-Luxembourg-
77%, Germany 76%. To this center we can also classify the Netherlands and north 
region of Italy, relatively lower was ITT in trade of Spain, Italy (south) and Ireland, 
namely the countries affected by the crisis of the euro. But the level of intra industry 
trade between Portugal and Greece and the EU partners were much lower than in 
trade the other members states: at least two times less than for example in France, 
Germany, Belgium, half less than in trade of Italy. The level of ITT in Portugal and 
Greece was at the same on the same level that in Poland, which doesn’t belong to the 
euro area (Poland Competitiveness Report, Warsaw 2008, p. 89). 
 
The diversity of the economic structure and intra industry trade prevents of course 
strong fluctuation of  terms of trade and the sudden changes in exchange rates.  The 
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coexistence in a monetary union of countries with different level of development 
under the roof of the euro led to different rates of growth of production, investments 
and export before the crisis. The ECB’ interest rates which was based more on the 
economic situation countries belonged to the center of the euro area had brought 
speculative boom and balance of payments disequilibrium in periphery partners. No 
wonder that the 2008-euro crisis affected mostly peripheral partners like Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Ireland, which have different structures and less competitive 
economy. The relinquishment national central bank policy in a monetary union puts 
more weight on the fiscal policies in partner countries as far as it comes to 
stabilizing their economies. In the view of D.A. Snider, the frontier of an optimum 
currency area should be limited by the possibility of conducting the effective fiscal 
and monetary policy between partners. Therefore, an essential condition for first 
speed Europe is to create common institutions,  which can help to avoid the 
problems with the application of contradictory means and negative effects that result 
from carrying out of different policies (Snider, 1967, p. 13-17). 
 
5. Perspective of the EU’ Reforms 
 
Considering all reservations towards the concepts of two speed Europe the questions 
arise what the perspective for such evolution of the EU are and which countries 
eventually should be admitted to this concept of “first speed Europe”.  On the one 
hand for the small similar and open economies, the marginal benefits from 
integration are the higher that marginal costs, on the other hand, with the size of the 
market too big and diversify union may be not necessarily an optimum currency 
area. White paper on the future of Europe published on 1 March 2017 maps out the 
drivers of change in the next decade and presents a range of five scenarios for how 
Europe could evolve by 2025 (White paper, Brussels, 1 March 2017): 
  
1. Carrying on:  In first scenario the EU sticks to its course on delivering its 
positive current reform agenda. By 2025 the member continues will focus on 
growth, investment and job creation by strengthening the single market and by 
stepping up investment in digital, transport and energy infrastructure. Further steps 
are previewing to improve euro functioning, financial supervision, to ensure the 
sustainability of public finances and to develop capital markets. Cooperation will  
also be reinforced in the field of the management of external borders. Common 
defense is mentioned among priorities to pool some military capabilities.  
           2. Nothing but the single market: In this minimum scenario the EU is 
gradually re-centered on the European single market, which becomes the main 
“raison d’être” of integration. Where the EU cannot agree to do more in many policy 
areas, it increasingly focuses on deepening certain key aspects of the single market, 
namely easier for the free movement of goods and capital, to develop common 
standards. This scenario creates a risk of a “race to the bottom”, where free 
movement of workers and services will not become fully guaranteed, migration and 
some foreign policy issues are increasingly left to bilateral cooperation; partners will 
not to work together in such areas as security or energy, fighting tax evasion.  
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         3. Those who want more do more: In the third scenario the EU allows willing 
partners to do more together in specific areas. “Coalitions of the willing” may 
emerge to work together in such specific policy areas as defense, taxation or social 
matters. A new group of partners may agree on specific legal, fiscal and budgetary 
arrangements in order to strengthen the euro area and single market, to deepen their 
cooperation in a few cutting-edge technologies, products and services as well as on 
security and justice matters. Relations with third countries, including trade with the 
UK will remain managed at EU level. 
4. Doing less more efficiently: In the fourth scenario the EU should focus 
on delivering more and faster in selected policy areas to tackle problems in the key 
new areas, while doing less elsewhere. Due to limited resources the EU would able 
to act more decisively in its chosen priority areas in such fields like in R&D, 
innovation, security, migration, the management of borders and defense, invests in 
new wide European projects. On the other hand, the EU should stop acting or does 
less  in such domains like regional development, agriculture, employment and social 
policy, consumer and environment protection, move away from detailed technical 
harmonization towards a strict minimum. 
  5. Doing much more together:  In the last scenario, the EU states decide 
to do much more together across all policy areas, to share more power, resources 
and decision-making across the board.  New financial resources will be available to 
boost economic development in partner countries and respond to the shocks at 
regional, sectoral and national level. In the euro area there is much greater 
coordination on fiscal, social, taxation matters, technological start-up,  supervision 
of financial services. In fifth scenario there is a strong focus to complete the single 
market in the field of energy, digital and services, and to finance wide infrastructure 
projects, to set up research centers like European “Silicon Valleys”. The EU is still 
represented by one seat in most international organization and a European Defense 
Union will be created. 
 
Though it is not known which scenario the best chance for the implementation has, it 
seems that the future of the EU will depend on a few fundamental factors. First, the 
success or failure of Brexit negotiations and shape of economic relations with the 
UK (2).  Secondly, the position of the EU depends on what lessons learned member 
countries from the crisis in the euro area and what shall undertake reforms to prevent 
similar downturns. Because one cannot separate membership in the EMU from 
membership in the EU, the future of the euro area also depends on the success of the 
EU, and the disintegration of the EU also means the breakdown of the euro area. 
Only reformed EU institutions and new perspective of profitable integration between 
partner countries can put an effective firewall against further its disintegration. 
                                                     
2 If the United Kingdom will conclude profitable agreement with the EU and will return on 
the path of rapid growth, then you may receive a knock-on effect and going in the footsteps 
by the other Member States.  If the UK will fail to conclude agreement with EU, then the 
barriers in mutual exchange will arise, the important costs of an instance might discourage 
other countries to follow this example. 
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Thirdly, the future of the EU also depends on how Member Countries cope with the 
problem of the influx of refugees and whether the scale of the influx will become 
significantly reduced.   
 
To answer to the perspective of the threat of the disintegration the EU must be taken 
to reform, even in a limited number of member states. In reference with this we can 
imagine different scenario of further development: division of Europe into” first 
speed Europe”; realization of concept of “multi speed Europe”; or even 
disintegration of the EU and individual economic agreement between countries.  The 
future of the single market depends on the maintenance of four freedoms, Schengen 
agreement, common rules of competition, as well as the of effective prevention of 
negative externalities  of some of these freedoms in the framework of regional 
policy and agricultural policy. Furthermore, the economic policy integration relay on 
success or failure of monetary union and effective coordination between monetary 
and fiscal policy. Since we do not have a clear model of the final functioning of 
European integration or we don’t not see the reform plan for all the EU, so we can 
imagine different scenarios of future development:  
 
Firstly, in connection with rising pessimism about mechanism of international 
integration some commentators do not believe in the success of the reforms the EU. 
Because of Brexit, huge public debts and the refugee’s crisis there appear voices, 
that all these problems can be better resolved by the national states than at EU level. 
They advocate of solution of the actual structure of EU and return to the concept of 
loose confederation of nation states, where national sovereignty is limited to 
absolute minimum. This would not be the solution of the EU as such; however, it 
would mean resignations from purposes as supranational organization and act to 
support the principles of free trade and the free movement of factors of production. 
Out of the question is only the need to maintain the rules of single market and of the 
customs union, provided the limitations of Schengen provisions and restore at least 
periodic border controls. However, the member states should gradually move away 
from political integration, a common EU policy in specific areas like regional and 
agricultural policy. In this scenario Europe as a loose confederation of national states 
there is no place for a euro area and their partners will return to national currencies 
in the long perspective. Supporters of functional integration are talking about the 
denationalization of monetary, agricultural policy, regional policy, reduction of 
resources devoted to the EU common budget. 
 
However, leaving the common policies seems to relate to important costs of the 
disintegration. Preliminary calculations show that any solution to the euro area is an 
expensive alternative for euro area citizens assessed on 9 500 – 11 500 euros in the 
first year and from 3500 to 4500 euros in the coming years, return to the national 
currency would entail coming back economic crisis, a decline in GDP of some 
Member States up to 25% (Forbes, Ames, New York, 2014 p.195). Proponents of 
the concept of a return to national currencies often forget, that elastic currency 
courses carry some cost of an increase in the risk of exchange rate, a reduction in 
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trade, the decline in investment, not to mention the possible inflation and ease 
speculate currencies.  
 
The second scenario is move to closer union and divide the EU for at least two 
group of members with their own sets of rules. We understand that Europe can't 
move along at one and the same pace, so two speed Europe seems to be of use to 
those countries, that need more freedom in carrying out own economic policies. 
Therefore, the current system of integration could be replaced by “first speed Europe 
“- to let countries which wish to integrate more robustly and “second speed Europe” 
giving partners an opportunity to switch the clubs. To this “first speed Europe 
“should be including countries with high mobility of labor force, strictly integrated 
capital market, a large proportion of tradable to non-tradable goods, high level of 
GDP and similar diversified of their economies. Theorists of integration limit also 
such area by the possibility of conducting the effective fiscal and monetary policy 
and low level of budget deficits and public debts (France, Germany, Austria, 
Finland, Benelux countries, perhaps Ireland, Spain, Estonia). Other than EU 
countries after the fulfilment of conditions of optimum currency area can also 
proceed to the “first speed Europe”. The smooth functioning of the “first speed 
Europe” requires moves towards a fiscal union with common budget and optimal 
budgetary spending in all area.  However, moving in this direction would engender 
transitional shock from a partial break up where the partners of the “first speed 
Europe” may suffer as well from the partial break up due to temporary instability on 
the financial markets. In the long run, they would probably face appreciation of euro 
in reference with a dollar and other currencies. 
 
Third the option is reforming the all EU as an effect of the recent economic 
downturn, refugee crisis and Brexit. These several recurrent crises have exposed the 
weakness of the EU institutional arrangements, so there are voices in favor of 
stronger multilateral surveillance of policies within the EU, better coordination 
between monetary and tax policy, solidarity to resolve refugees’ problems, effective 
trade policy to resistance toward growing protectionism in the world economy. No 
institutional reforms in the EU mean acceptance of the inherent fragility and 
potentially break up. If the EU takes the necessary structural reforms, would keep 
free trade and free flows of factors of production, improve external border 
protection, would be able to coordinate economic policies between members, then 
they would create the effective and viable block to be able to compete on the 
international scene, otherwise it would face the danger of further disintegration.  
 
The reform of the EU would be exercised in many of its areas of activity, including 
agricultural policy, regional, budgetary, social policy. In the annual summary of 
activities of the EU with its President J. C. Junker pushed for reforms in the EU and 
he appealed to the 7 Member States outside the euro area to join the Monetary and 
Banking Union, "if we want the euro unify our continent and does not go away” 
(Financial Times, 2017.) Although this is the concept of closer integration based on 
the euro including all EU members, it seems that the current substantial differences 
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between Member States concerning the refugee problems is the prospect of the most 
difficult to achieve.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The notion of “two speed Europe” seems to be a rational solution in the view of 
recurrent the EU crisis, that allows one partners to moving faster in integration 
process, but to slower speed of the rest of Europe. The original sources of 
conception to dive the Europe into two speed are coming from diversification of the 
EU countries and as well as conviction that common policy in many fields is not 
suitable now for all partners. Therefore, a variable Europe with first and second 
speed may increase the political and economic efficiency of the EU given the 
member countries more freedom to carry out specific policy. To achieve new 
benefits from integration the EU need new ideas of cooperation, if necessary, even 
in limited circle of “first speed Europe”.  
 
In the absence of decisive reforms, the institutional weakness of the EU can deepen 
keeping the current status quo and reform atrophy. All steps towards “first speed 
Europe” are collateral and one steps followed the other: monetary integration 
requires sticker fiscal integration, fiscal integration requires banking union, but 
fiscal and banking unions are going to require some form of a political union. In the 
opinion of the author the concept of Europe of two speeds is a rational option if the 
“first speed Europe “will be built around the countries which create optimal 
currency area. Only the effective coordination between monetary policy of EBC 
with national fiscal policies and the common budget equipped with adequate 
resources will provide protection against repeated economic crises and encroaching 
into new areas of profitable cooperation will restore belief in success of European 
integration.  
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